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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TIMOTHY KEVIN DUNCAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900217-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant TIMOTHY KEVIN DUNCAN relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. 
Appellant responds to the State's answer to his opening brief as 
follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When a defendant enters a plea of guilty to an offense, he 
is considered to have been "convicted" under applicable Utah 
authority. At least for impeachment purposes, a court does not have 
to enter a "judgment of conviction" for the conviction to exist. 
The trial court here abused its discretion when it precluded Timothy 
Duncan from impeaching the credibility of a key State witness, a 
former felon. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT 
TO IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATED KEY 
WITNESS WITH EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR FELONY CONVICTION, 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
In its brief, the State wrote, "the specific question 
presented here is whether the trial court correctly concluded that 
Skillings's prior conviction was a misdemeanor conviction not 
punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year and therefore 
inadmissible under rule 609(a)(1)." Appellee's brief at 4. The 
State also noted that "[t]he rule [609(a)] focuses on a prior 
conviction • . ." Appellee's brief at 4 (emphasis in original). 
Timothy Duncan agrees with the focal point of the rule but 
he disagrees with the State's framing of the issue. This Court must 
do more than simply address whether "Skillings's prior conviction 
was a misdemeanor conviction not punishable by imprisonment in 
excess of one year. . ." The issue also must address whether the 
crime "was punishable by . . . imprisonment in excess of one year," 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1), even though a judgment of conviction was 
later entered "for the next lower category of offense . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1); cf;. Appellant's opening brief at 2. Utah 
R. Evid. 609(a)(1) provides: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or 
established by public record during cross-examination 
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under 
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which he was convicted, and the court determines that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. . . 
Id. (emphasis added). The plain language of the rule applies "if 
the crime was punishable" as a felony. See Appellant's opening 
brief at 12-13 n.3. The rule would not preclude the admission of a 
crime which was punishable as a felony but subsequently reduced to a 
misdemeanor. 
In the instant action, Michael "Skillings entered a guilty 
plea to Attempted Distribution of Cocaine, a Third-Degree Felony, at 
the time of [arraignment or] sentencing before Judge Sawaya." 
(T 75-77). The State's argument is that "Skilling's guilty plea did 
not in itself constitute a conviction; it was nothing more than 'an 
acknowledgment that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.711 
Appellee's brief at 4-5. Contrary to the State's position, however: 
The weight of judicial authority considers and holds 
that a guilty plea is a conviction just as is the 
verdict of a jury. This is so whether such 
interpretation of a guilty plea or verdict is said to 
be so in the popular sense or in the statutory or 
judicial sense. 
State v. Delashmutt. 676 P.2d 383, 384 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) 
(footnote omitted). 
In its attempt to distinguish Delashmutt, the State argued, 
"in [Delashmutt] the supreme court obviously assumed that the 
defendant's prior guilty plea had been accepted by the trial court 
and a judgment of conviction had been entered on the plea at the 
time sentence was imposed." Appellee's brief at 7. Neither the 
language nor the inferences of Delashmutt support the State's 
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reading of the opinion. The trial court may have accepted defendant 
Delashmutt's prior guilty plea but it could not have entered a 
judgment of conviction. If a judgment of conviction had been 
entered, there would have been no need for the supreme court to 
address "whether for impeachment purposes a plea of guilty to a 
felony is a conviction." Delashmutt, 676 P.2d at 384 (since 
defendant Delashmutt's prior guilty plea involved a felony, if a 
conviction did in fact exist in the manner believed by the State in 
the case at bar, there would have been no dispute that it was 
admissible for impeachment purposes). 
State v. Delashmutt, 676 P.2d 383 (Utah 1983), and United 
States v. Turner. 497 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1974), are the governing 
authorities in this jurisdiction for the involved issue. Both cases 
address directly whether the entry of a guilty plea should be 
considered a conviction, and both cases support the position of 
Timothy Duncan. See Appellant's opening brief at 8-12. By 
comparison, the State's reliance on the dicta of State v. Theison, 
709 P.2d 307 (Utah 1985) (per curiam), is misplaced. 
The State cites Theison in support of its claim "[t]hat the 
judgment of conviction is the relevant reference point rather than 
the guilty plea. . ." Appellee's brief at 6. Consideration of at 
least two pertinent Utah authorities unequivocally reject the 
State's claim. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c) states, inter alia, "Upon a 
verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose a sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which 
shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence." 
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Id. The plain language of the rule requires, first, the guilty 
plea; second, the sentence; and third, entry of a judgment of 
conviction. Similarly, Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4 states, "No person 
shall be punished for a public offense until convicted in a court 
having jurisdiction." In order for the two authorities to be 
consistent, a conviction exists after the entry of a guilty plea and 
before the imposition of sentence. Cf. North Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25 (1970) (a defendant's guilty plea, even when entered 
without a formal admission of guilt, may be a sufficient basis for 
imposing punishment). Delashmutt and Turner are in accord with 
these authorities. 
The dicta of Theison is also not inconsistent with the 
prevailing authority. The language there,1 if found to be 
applicable to the present case, merely suggests that for a 
"conviction" to exist, a trial court should accept the defendant's 
guilty plea. At best, Theison extends Delashmutt's holding, that "a 
prior plea of guilty to a felony is a conviction," 676 P.2d at 384, 
1
 In State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307 (Utah 1985) (per 
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[bjecause the record before 
us is inadequate, we are unable to ascertain whether or not a 
conviction of second degree theft (or some other category of 
offense) was entered." 709 P.2d at 309. The Court did not rule out 
the possibility that a conviction occurred; rather, it explained 
that there was nothing in the record "to show any acceptance of the 
guilty plea, findings, conviction, judgment, or imposition of 
sentence by the lower court upon the defendant." Id. at 308 
(emphasis added). Had the lower court in Theison accepted the 
guilty plea entered by the defendant, Theison may have had a bearing 
on the involved issue. But the record in Theison lacked such a 
finding and left the Supreme Court unable to "determine in what 
manner the [trial] court acted." 709 P.2d at 3 08. 
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to a principle stating, "a prior plea of guilty to a felony and the 
court's acceptance thereof is a conviction•" Theison does not 
require a court to "enter a judgment of conviction" before the 
guilty plea can be considered a conviction. Indeed, a court could 
not "enter a judgment of conviction" until after sentencing 
(i.e. after the formal existence of the conviction). Utah R. Crim. 
P. 22(c). 
In addition, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 remains consistent 
with the holding of Delashmutt and Turner, as well as with the dicta 
of Theison. Section 402, like Rule 609, addresses "the conviction" 
in a manner which indicates that it was already in existence. If 
the conviction did exist, it "was punishable" as a felony 
(i.e. "that category of offense established by statute"). Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-402; see also Utah R. Evid. 609. Section 402 states in 
relevant part: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature 
and circumstances of the offense of which the 
defendant was found guilty and to the history and 
character of the defendant, concludes that it would be 
unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for 
that category of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally 
applicable to that offense, the court may, unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower category of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the 
conviction shall be deemed to be a misdemeanor if: 
(a) The judge designates the sentence to be 
for a misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is 
within the limits provided by law for a 
misdemeanor; . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (emphasis added). 
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While the statute does allow the court to "enter a judgment 
of conviction for the next lower category of offense[,]" entry of 
such a judgment does not, at least for impeachment purposes,2 negate 
the existence of the prior felony guilty plea. Admittedly, "a 
judgment of conviction" may support the existence of a "conviction," 
but it is not a prerequisite to a "conviction." 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in excluding the prior 
felony conviction of Michael Skillings, the key witness for the 
State whose credibility was central to the presentation of its 
case. See, e.g., Appellants opening brief at 16 n.6 and 
accompanying text. The plain language of Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) 
required the court to admit the prior felony conviction of Michael 
Skillings. Having failed to do so, Timothy Duncan was improperly 
convicted.3 
2
 Impeachment and credibility are considerations crucial 
to this appeal. The court should have allowed Timothy Duncan to use 
Michael Skillings prior felony conviction against him to attack his 
credibility. By analogy, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), 
also supports Timothy Duncan's position. In Harris, the Court 
allowed the prosecution to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence, 
statements taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), for the sole purpose of impeaching defendant Harris7 
credibility. Defendant Harris7 statements, like Michael Skillings 
prior guilty plea, would ordinarily be inadmissible for substantive 
purposes. However, when the credibility of the witness7 testimony 
is at issue, the otherwise inadmissible evidence becomes admissible 
only for impeachment purposes. 
3
 "Because the resolution of this case depends entirely 
on questions of law, we [appellate courts] accord no particular 
deference to the rulings of the circuit and district courts on any 
of the points presented." Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 
455, 456 (Utah 1989). In determining whether Michael Skillings7 
-[footnote continued on next page]-
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant/Appellant Timothy Kevin 
Duncan respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction 
and remand this case for a new trial. 
/ A 
SUBMITTED this [*> day of November, 1990. 
RONALD S. TUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
3 -[cont'd]- prior guilty plea constituted a felony 
conviction or a misdemeanor conviction, the trial court made a 
ruling on a question of law. No particular deference is afforded 
its decision. Alternatively, even under the State's standard of 
review, the "trial [pourt's ruling] on the admissibility of evidence 
[should] be overturned [because of the] clear abuse of discretion.," 
State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988); see Appellee's 
brief at 1. 
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ADDENDUM A 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 22 
mental illness in connection with a finding of 
guilty requires a trial judge to find the defen-
dant guilty and mentally ill and then deter-
mine the appropriate disposition of the defen-
dant, whether it be to prison or to the state 
hospital. State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621 (Utah 
1987). 
Sentence. 
—Length. 
A defendant who is found guilty and men-
Brigham Young Law Review. — Convict-
ing or Confining? Alternative Directions in In-
sanity Law Reform: Guilty But Mentally 111 
Versus New Rules for Release of Insanity Ac-
quittees, 1983 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 499. 
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investi-
gation, § 76-3-404. 
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing 
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E. 
tally ill should be given a sentence of the same 
duration as any other defendant convicted of 
the same offense. Committing such a defen-
dant to the state mental hospital does not in-
terrupt or extend the length of the defendant's 
sentence. State v. DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621 
(Utah 1987). 
A.L.R. — Pyromania and the criminal law. 
51 A.L.R.4th 1243. 
Probation revocation: insanity as defense, 56 
A.L.R.4th 1178. 
Suspending imposition of sentence and plac-
ing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the 
time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
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